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Denizer and Gelb examine  the process  of eco-  tional limitations;  political  considerations;
nomnic  transformation  in Mongolia,  a huge,  whether  a "model"  of transformation  exists;  and
isolated,  sparsely  populated  country.  After  a contracting  resource  envelope.
identifying  factors  that led to formulation  of a
radical  adjustment  program  in such an isolated  Using  a simple  computable  general  equilib-
Wountry,  they focus on Mongolia's  innovative  rium  model,  they analyze  the impact  of the
voucher  privatization  scheme,  and the interplay  cutoff  of Soviet  aid, which amounted  to 30
between  the speed of contraction  in resource  percent  of GDP, and of the disruption  of trade.
availability  and that of the movement  to a market  They conclude  that preventing  a decline  in
economy.  They show that the reform  process  welfare  of more than  20 percent  - which is
was not smooth:  that after the rapid  formulation  close to the decline  in 1991  - would  require aid
and implementation  of major  reforms,  there was  flows  of about 15  percent of GDP.
a marked  slowdown,  when reform  timetables
were revised  and a more gradualist  approach  Their model  suggests  that the rural sector  is
adopted.  Later, reforms  driven  by the privatiza-  reasonably  well  insulated  from extemal shocks,
tion program  picked  up momentum  again.  But  in sharp contrast  with the urban sector.
one important  lesson  leamed in Mongolia  is that
voters are likely to shy away from radical  One response  scenario  explored  by the
reformers  when faced with growing  shortages  model is that of massive  reverse  migration  to
and a collapsing  economy.  In June 1922,  the  rural areas.  They point  out that the more  the
Mongolian  People's Revolutionary  Party (the  resource  envelope  tightens  and squeezes  away
former  communist  paity) was returned  to power  the margin above  subsistence,  the harder  it will
in general  elecions, capturing  72 of 76 parlia-  be to sustain  an orderly  pattern  of reform.  In the
mentary seats.  extreme,  this pattern  may force the country  to
adopt  a rationed  "wartime"  economy,  despite
Denizer and Gelb identify  factors  related  to  intentions  to shift to a marlcet  system.
speed versus caution:  organizational  and institu-
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I  Introduction
Largely  unnoticed  by the West,  Mongolia  began to move away from Soviet
domination  and  a centrally  planned  economy  with  the  first  stirring  of Glasnost.
Though  still  within  the  context  of central  planning,  economic  decentralization
began  as early  as 1984,  but  by 1990  the  country  was  on the  way to implementing
a radical  transformation  program  which  aimed  to create  a market  economy. Such
a program,  like those  in Eastern  Europe  after  1990,  would  need to address  the
entire  spectrum  of economic  reform,  including  price and trade  liberalization,
rapid  privatization,  and  a  fundamental  change  in  the  economic  role  of the  state.
Mongolia's  program  aimed  at all these  areas,  in  particular  privatization  where
an innovative  voucher  scheme  was  initiated  before  any  country  in  Eastern  Europe.
Moreover,  the  program  was  initiated  under  exceptionally  difficult  conditions,  due
to the  withdrawal  of Soviet  aid  and  serious  disruption  of trading  links  within
COMECON.
How could  one of the  most isolated  countries  in the world - certainly
geographically,  and  possibly  also  in  terms  of  trade  and  intellectual  interactions
outoide  the  Soviet  bloc - propose  so radical  a transformation?Z1  Which  factors
encouraged  the "big  bang" reform  strategy,  and which hindered  it?  Was this
actually  implemented?  Or  have  the  radical  steps  to  the  market  been  slowed  down?
These are  some of the questions discussed in this paper, which outlines
Mongolia's  economic  transformation  program  and reports  progress  to date.
Sections  II,  III  and  IV summarize  the  program  in four  phases:
1/  We are indebted  to Peter  Murrell  for  extensive  and  extremely  useful
comments  and  explanations, and  to  Mr. Zolzharghal  for  assisting  us with
information  on recent  developments  in Mongolia's  reform. Mete  Durdag,  Ms.
Hulan  and  Vedat  Milor  provided  useful  comments. All errors  and  omissions  are
the  responsibility  of the  authors  alone.
2/  Other  intellectually  isolated  socialist  countries  include  Albania  and
North  Korea,  neither  of which  has  produced  a reform  program  comparable  to that
of Mongolia. It is difficult  to find  a comparator  for  physical  isolation.2
the cautious  initial  reforms  after 1985; the rapid formulation  of a radical
transformation  program,  July 1990 - October 1991; an apparent slowdown  in
implementation  and  a  new,  extended  timetable  for  privatization:  November  1991 -
February  1992;  and the subsequent  beginning  of large scale  privatization  and
apparent  regaining  of reform  momentum. Section  V considers  factors  making  for
speed  versus  caution  in the reform  process,  and their  possible  weight  in the
Mongolian  case.  An important  element  of Section  V is the assessment  of the
adverse impact  of the Soviet  aid and trade shock using a simple  computable
general  equilibrium  (CGO)  model  outlined  in  the  Annex,  and  the  interplay  between
the  speed  of contraction  and that  of  movement  to a  market  economy.
Before  proceeding,  two  points  should  be  made.  First,  this  paper  does  not
attempt  to judge  the  reform  proposals  and  their  execution,  nor  to  predict  their
future  course.  Second,  policy  announcements  in Mongolia  have sometimes  been
contradictory  and the data base is limited.11 There is therefore  room for
considerable  differences  of interpretation  of the actual, as well as the
intended,  evolution  of both  policies  and  outcomes.
II.  Mongolia  and  Its  Early  Reforms
At half the size  of India  Mongolia  is large  but sparsely  populated  with
only  2.1  million  people. High  and  landlocked  between  the  former  USSR  and  China,
its  climate  is  unusually  severe,  with  temperatures  below  freezing  from  October
to March.  Because of this, animal husbandry has traditionally  been very
important  to Mongolian  economy  and culture.  With a national  livestock  of 26
million  and  abundant  grazing  land,  extensive  animal  husbandry  remains  the  base
for  its  light  industry  (mostly  processing),  and  for  agricultural  exports.
Climactic  factors  limit  large  scale crop cultivation. However,  Mongolia  has
significant  and largely  unutilized  natural resources  - minerals,  nonferrous
metals  including  gold  and  silver,  hydrocarbons  and  semiprecious  stones. It  also
has  abundant  reserves  of coal and copper. Mining  is a  major export  industry.
I/  For  examples  of contradictory  policies,  see  Murrell,  Korsun  and  Dunn
(1992).3
With vast territory,  low population  density and inadequate  infrastructure,
markets  remain  thin  and  fragmznted,  and  it is  difficult  to  realize  economies  of
scale  in  production.
After  its  establishment  in  1924,  Mongolia  became  the  unoffic'.al  "sixteenth"
Soviet  republic.  It  remained  internationally  isolated  and  its  close  relationship
with the  Soviet  Union  and ties  to other  CNEA  countries  shaped  its  development
framework  towards  centrally  planning. Gradually  Mongolia  became  integrated  with
and  dependent  upon the  Soviet  and  the  CMEA  economies. From  the  mid 1950s,  the
Soviet  Union  and  other  CMA  countries  provided  large-scale  financial  assistance;
during  the  second  half  of the  1980s  the  flow  of  foreign  resources  in  the  form  of
grants  and  loans  accounted  for  30  percent  of  Mongolia's  GDP  per  year. The  other
part  of  this  dependence  was  increasing  trade  volume  with  the  CMEA  countries.  By
the  1980s  about  97  percent  of  trade  took  place  with  these  countries.  The  Soviet
Union  accounted  for  95  percent  of  the  total  trade  volume,  supplied  Mongolia  with
all  of its  petroleum,  energy,  capital  and  consumer  goods,  and  received  in  return
copper  concentrate,  wool,  leather  and  meat.
Some  dimensions  of  Mongolia's  structural  dependence  are  shown  in  Table  1.
The massive  resource  deficit  of almost  30* of GDP, funded  by low-cost  Soviet
loans,  mainly  covered  the  fiscal  deficit. Government  spending  equalled  65W  of
GDP  with  current  spending  half  of  GDP,  largely  to  sustain  living  standards  at  an
acceptable  minimum and support  its  well-developed  social  consumption  system.
Mongolia's  exports  were heavily  concentrated,  with minerals  and  raw  materials
(notably  cashmere,  leather  and  wool)  accounting  for  70W  of the  total. Only  5S
of exports or 1l of GDP, almost all raw materials,  went to non-socialist
countries  although  these supplied  one third of imports.  Except  in the self-
sufficient  pastoral  economy,  Mongolia's  imports  played  a  critical  role,  supplying
fuels,  intermediate  and  capital  goods,  spare  parts  and  consumer  goods  including
urban  foodstuffs.
Particularly after  1960,  central planning  transformed Mongolia's
socioeconomic  structure  and  contributed  to  the  technological  dualization  of the
economy.  Prior  to 1921,  Mongolia  was  a  simple  agrarian  economy  with  the  majority4
Table  1
Poaoliat  Structural Indicators
Perc_ntaQu of GDP  Trade Structure
1988  1990  Percentage of Exports 1988
Exports  26  23  Minerals  40
Imports  54  50  Raw Materials  30
Resource Balance  -28  -27
ExDorts to Non-Socialist
Fiscal Revenues  45  51  Countries 1988
Government Exp.  65  64  Percent of Total
(Current  Exp.  50  52)  exports  5
(Subs.&  Transfers  18  20)  Share of Raw
Fiscal Balance  -20  -13  Materials  94
(Pct.For.financed  100  78)
Imports from Non-Socialist
Total Absorption  128  127  Countries 188
Investment  42  20  Percent of total
Private Consumption  62  75  imports  33
Public Consumption  24  22
Balance  of  Payments
$millions
1988  1990  1991
Exports  829  468  432
imports  1849  1047  564
Current Acct.  -1033  -644  -100
CMEA Dependence: Mongolia and Eastern Europe
Export Share  Non-CMEA Exports/  Direct Loss
to CMEA  (e)  GDP  (e)  from CMEA Shock/
GDP  (e)
Mongolia  95  1  30*
Bulgaria  70  15  12
C8FR  50  15  7
Hungary  40  22  6
Poland  40  12  s
*  Aid shock only5
of the  population living  as nomadic herdsmen.  These still represent most of the
44 percent  of the population  living in rural areas.  However, buttressed  by
Soviet aid and  mining revenues, industrial investment grew in the 1970s and  most
of the 1980s, superimposing a modern urban economy onto the traditional one.
Spearheaded by industry, GDP grew at an average rate of 5.5 percent between 1970
and 1990, attracting Mongolians to urban areas.  By the end of the 1980s,  56
percent of the population was living in the three main cities, mainly employed
as civil servants  (about 212,000 in 1991) and by  industry  (167,000).  Great
achievements were made in  the social sectors.  Mongolia achieved a 97  percent rate
of literacy, and a well developed educational infrastructure. Its health system
was effective, with more doctors per head than the USA and adequate access to
medical services.  l'he  crude death rate fell from 22 per thoueand in 1940 to 8.4
by 1989.  As  in Eastern Europe, social welfare was protected by an extensive
system of subsidies and transfers.  By the end of the period, pensions  and
allowances were received  by some  800,000  persons out of its 2  million population.
Sharp social dualism was therefore largely avoided, and living standards were
broadly  comparable  in  town  and  countryside.
In  the  second  half  of  the  1980s  Mongolia's  growth  performance  started  to
experience  difficulties.  GDP growth  slowed  to  4.6  percent  between  1987-89
from 7  percent during the 1981-86 period, and there were increasingly shortages
of consumer goods.  Slowdown was partly due to the economic malaise affecting
CMEA  partners and partly due to the inadequacy of domestic resources to sustain
growth.  Dissatisfaction  with  central planning  grew,  and  culminated in  the
removal of Tsedenbahl  (Mongolia's leader during much of the period) in August
1984, an event  that marked  the beginning  of economic  and political  reform.
Influenced by the political changes in the Soviet Union and with nationalism
resurgent (as  in  the former Soviet republics), Mongolia launched its  own program
of  political  openness  and economic  restructuring.  The  reforms  implemented
between  1984  and  1989  included:  streamlining  government  agencies,  reducing
subsidies and decentralizing to reduce expenditures and improve public finance,6
and  giving  financial  autonomy  to  public  enterprises  which  resulted  in  a  trend  to
self-managements'.
However,  these  reforms,  summarized  in Table  2, were cautious  ones that
aimed  to increase  the  efficiency  of the  command  economy. The government  that
took office  in December  1984  "revised"  the eighth five year plan, so that
reforms  still  took  place  in  a  planned  context.  Perhaps  because  the  measures  were
not structural  on^s,  they did  not  improve  public  finances. Deficits  increased
throughout  the  1980s,  and  public  expenditures  still  accounted  for  moze than 60
percent  of GDP.  About 80 percent  of spending  was current,  and half of this
consisted  of  subsidies  and  transfers.  Overall  budgetary  deficits  jumped  from  6.9
of  GDP  in  1985  to  17.7  in  1986  and  to 19.5  in 1988. They  were  entirely  financed
by the  USSR and  provided  the  main driving  force  for  growth  in 1986-89.
Mongolia's  dependence  on the  USSR and susceptibility  to external  shocks
therefore  increased.  In 1989  the  effects  of Soviet  economic  difficulties  began
to be felt.  Soviet  financial  assistance  to cover  the  budget  deficit
halved  in  1988-1990,  a loss  equivalent  to  15  percent  of  Mongolia's  GDP,  and  the
CMRA  trading  system  began  to  crumble.  The  contractionary  effects  of  these  shocks
began to be felt  by the economy.  Output  declined  by 2.1  percent  in 1990  and
there  were sharp  increases  in unemployment  and inflation,  both entirely  new
phenomena  in  Mongolia.
III  The  Formulation  of a Big  Bana
Increasing  economic  difficulties,  shortages  of consumer  goods, rising
prices  and  visible  unemployment  led,  despite  more  reforms  in  January,  to  popular
demonstrations  in  March 1990. These  resulted  in a comprehensive
program  of economic  transformation  being  proposed  by the  ruling  communists  and
the  first  multiparty  election  in  July. A coalition  government,  still  dominated
by the  Mongolian  People's  Revolutionary  Party  (MPRP),  was  formed  in  September  but
some  of the  most important  positions,  including  that  of deputy  prime  minister
4/  A similar  movement  towards  self-management  took  place in  Eastern  Europe
arid  the  USSR  as enterprises  received  more autonomy.7
Table  2
ECONOMIC AND STRUCTURAL  REFORMS
1986  1990  (cont.)
*  Establishment  of Customs  Affairs  Department
*  Increase  in domestic  wholesale  prices.  and  Tax  Service  Department.
'  Limited  autonomy  granted  to public  sector  *  Promulgation  of new  Foreign  Investment  Law.
enterprises  for investment.  *  Devaluation  of tugrik  vis-a-vis  US  dollar  for
*  Introduction  of long-term  bank  loans  for  commercial  transactions.
investment  *  Introduction  of restricted  foreign  exchange
auction  system.
1987  *  Negotiation  of most-favored-nation  trade
agreements  with countries  in the convertible
*  Modification  of investment  planning  system  for  currency  area.
setting  overall  targets.
- Expansion  of investment  autonomy  of public  1991
sector  enterprises.
=  Rationalization  of number  of govemment  *  Increase  in retail  prices  of most  goods.
ministries.  *  Lengthened  maturity  structure  of term  deposits
and  increased  interest  rates.
1988  *  Substantial  reduction  of budgetary  subsidy  for
Imported  goods  and  to loss-making  erf.erprises.
*  Reduction  in five-year  plan  performance  indices.  *  Devaluation  of tugrik  vis-a-vis  US  dollar  to Tug
e  Further  decentralization  of budgetary  operations  40 = $1.
to local  level.  *  Adjustments  to wages,  pension  benefits,  and
*  Umited  liberalization  of agricultural  pricng and  private  savings  deposits  to soften  impact  of
marketing  in excess  of state orders.  price  increase.
o  Promotion  of private  sector  cooperatives  under  *  Privatization  Law  passed  and  program  for small
new Law  on Cooperatives.  privatization  Initiated.
*  Introduction  of more  depreciated  *  Banking  Law  passed,  and  Bank  of Mongolia
noncommercial  tugrik/US  dollar  exchange  rate.  established  as the  central  bank. Separate
commercial  banks  established.
1989  *  Direct  export  rights  granted  to selected
manufacturers.
*  Uberalization  of intrapublic-sector  enterprises
pricing  and  expansion  of operating  autonomy.  1992
*  Modest  easing  of restrictions  on private  herd
ownership.  *  Further  liberalization  of prices  (except  for public
*  Elimination  of monopoly  of state  trading  services,  utility tariffs, public  housing  rents,
corporations.  selected  medicines,  flour, bread,  and  rationed
*  Increase  in selected  administered  retail  prices.  vodka).
*  Easing  of foreign  exchange  surrender  *  Eiminated  mandatory  state orders  for exports.
requirements.  *  Passed  Bankruptcy  Law
*  Introduction  of preferential  domestic  prices  tor  *  Partial  liberalization  of issue  of foreign  trading
exported  goods.  licenses.
*  Introduced  weekly  monitoring  of budgetary
1990  revenues  and  expenditures.
*  Established  a stock  exchange.
*  F1imination  of restrictions  on  private  ownership  *  Simplified  interbank  clearing  and  payments
of herds.  arrangements.
*  Freeing  of selected  retail  prices.  *  Assigned  responsibility  for transportation  policy
*  Legalization  of two-tiered  banking  system  and  to a single  coordinating  authority,  General
establishment  of two commercial  banks.  Department  of Transportation.
*  Rationalization  of govemment  ministries;  *  Start  of large  scale  privatization.
elimination  of State  Planning  Committee.  *  Completion  of small-scale  privatization.8
with responsibility  for  privatization,  were  held by  other  more reformist  parties.
A new president was installed.  Reform measures announced between January 1990
and  July  1991  included  a  doubling  of  almost  all  prices,  subsidy  cuts,
devaluation, privatization measures, banking reform including the creation of a
new central bank, tax reforms, the elimination of all restrictions on private
ownership of  herds, and fundamental legal reforms.  Meanwhile, with  major changes
taking place in traditional relationships with other CMEA countries, Mongolia
agreed to value trade and effect settlement in convertable currencies from the
beginning of 1991.
Prices and Markets.  Price liberalization was formally extended to cover
60 percent of products and administered prices were increased by about 10001
Nevertheless, the official distribution system still dominated trade, and the
shrinking pool of foreign exchange was still tightly controlled.  Imports were
therefore de facto rationed, and the result was to squeeze the margin of goods
available on  parallel markets, and slow the  emergence of the small-scale  private
trading sector  which was unable to  obtain goods.  Wages and savings deposits  were
also doubled, to offset price increases.  As a result, the ratio of prices on
parallel markets to official prices still averaged about 2 to 1, much the same
after the price reform as before.  With devaluation of the Tugrik to 40 per
dollar, domestic prices  for many goods and services were still  low by world
standards. Low domestic  prices were  maintained through  the continued  application
of trade controls through the dominant  public distribution and marketing system,
to head off adverse social consequences of further sharp price hikes.
Price and market liberalization was therefore quite incomplete, and there
was little movement towards current convertibility.  In this area, Mongolia's
actual reforms fell short  of its  rhetoric, and  were less  comprehensive than those
of Eastern EuropeA/
5/  It is understood that this refers to 60W of prices rather than 60% of the
value of marketed output.
6/  For an account of the seemingly contradictory regulation of prices
(including  phases of apparent re-regulation) see Murrell et, al  (1992).9
Another distinctive feature of Mongolia's reforms was the introduction of
consumer  rationing in  January 1991. Half  of the rationed items,  including sugar,
rice and flour, involved imports.  At 2.7 kilograms per person per month, meat
rations covered about one third of previous consumption levels.
Private  Sector Development  As in Eastern Europe  and the  USSR Mongolia had
seen some emergence of private activities and some spontaneous privatization of
state  assets.2  With  the  removal  of  formal  discrimination against  private
activities  in 1988, private  sector development  accelerated.  The number  of
private cooperatives grew from 180 in 1988 to nearly 3,000 in 1990, and these
employed well over 20,000.  Other private firms also began to appear.  By 1990
their number reached 4,200 and they reportedly employed about 32,000.  These
firms were mostly in services and light manufacturing for the domestic market.
Including an additional 4,000 self-employed, some 56,000 people  out of total
employment of about 965,000 therefore  worked in  new private sector activities by
1990.
The main barrier to greater private activity was the almost total lack of
access to goods and foreign exchange due to the combination  of a continued state
distribution  system and the shrinking economywide resource envelope.  This
hindered the private accuiklulation  of capital through trading.  Indeed, private
firms sought to be included in the state distribution system and were, with a
quota of 10% of trade being reserved for private businesses.8/
Privatization The most striking  announcement in  1991  was  the  privatization
program, extremely ambitious in terms of both number of enterprises and initial
timetable.  344  large  enterprises  and  1601  small  enterprises  were  to  be
privatized by the end of 1992, through free distribution of share vouchers to
every citizen born prior to the approval of the Privatization Law.  The program
7/  For an account of spontaneous privatization in the USSR, see Shatalov
(1991).  Gelb and Gray  (1990)  discuss spontaneous privatization in Eastern
Europe.
8/  As of October 1992 private firms were still included in the state
distribution system.  This provides another indication of the very limited
nature of price and market reform.10
had two distinct  components:  small  and large  privatizations  and two types  of
vouchers.  Red  vouchers, with face value of  Tugrik 1000 were  for  the
privatization  of the  1601  small  businesses,  all  agricultural  assets  except  for
land  and  livestock,  and  other  small  assets. The  total  book  value  of small  assets
was  Tugrik  9.4  billion. Blue  vouchers,  with face  value  Tugrik  7,000,  were for
the  privatization  of  the  344  large  enterprises  with  a book  value  of Tugrik  10.8
billion.  Each citizen  was entitled  to three  red and one blue voucher.  Red
vouchers  were  tradeable  on  secondary  markets. Blue  vouchers  were  not  tradeable,
but  could  be assigned  twice  to  nominees.
The face values  of the vouchers  were only notional,  reflecting  the
simply  estimated  historical  cost of the assets  to be privatized. The actual
market  value  of the  assets  would  depend  on  forward-looking  projections.  Because
they  were freely  tradeable,  the  market  value  of red  coupons  could  diverge  from
their face value even before  privatization. Although  blue vouchers  had no
secondary  market, they would purchase  shares  that would subsequently  become
tradeable,  at  prices  that  would  then  reflect  their  "true"  market  value.
Assets  in the small  privatization  category  would  be transferred  to the
private  sector  at  auctions  arranged  by local  authorities  with  guidelines  set  the
Privatization  Commission.  The  Commission  was  responsible  for  the  historical  cost
valuation,  and  would  inform  the  public  by listing  the  assets  to  be auctioned  in
newspapers  across  the country.  Only red vouchers  could  be used to bid; the
highest  bid  would  win  and  the  Privatization  Commission  would  issue  the  ownership
certificate  to  the  winner. However,  the  workers  of  those  establishments  had  the
first right to acquire them at the value determined  by the Privatization
Commission,  using  red  coupons.
Privatization  of large  enterprises  would also be by auction,  for blue
vouchers. Enterprises  would  develop  privatization  plans  and  obtain  approval  to
implement  them from the  Privatization  Commission. The Commission  would  value
their  fixed  assets, audit  the  balance  sheet,  and issue  shares  on the  basis  of
net  assets.  The enterprises  would  then  be converted  to joint  stock  companies.
Ten  percent  of their  shares  would  be granted  to  the  employees,  who  would  then  be11
able to participate  in the auction on an equal basis with otherS. 21 The
remaining  shares  would  be  sold  sequentially,  in  batches.  Bidders  would  declare
a price  or price  range  for  shares (in  term  of blue vouchers)  and  a time  period
during  which  their  bid  would  remain  valid.  Brokers  in  each  aimak  throughout  the
country  would  collect  declarations  and  phone  in  a  bid  to the  stock  market. The
broker  with  the  highest  bid  for  the  batch  would  register  the  owners  and  provide
them with ownership  certificates.  Individuals  who were unable  to choose  a
company  or  did  not  understand  the  process  could  invest  in  mutual  funds  operated
by the  brokerage  firms. However,  the  funds  would  not  be allowed  to control  more
than 20 percent  of shares  of a given company. After full  privatization  of a
sufficient  number  of enterprises,  secondary  trading  would  begin. At that  stage
foreigners  would  be able  to buy shares.
Like  other  voucher  schemes,  Mongolia's  approach  to  privatization  aims  to
transfer ownership  quickly to a private sector  which lacks wealth-land  is
designed  to  be fair  ex-ante  but  not  ex-post.  As  noted  by  Kraay  (1992)  it  reduces
problems associated  with  "spontaneous  privatization"  (which  damaged the
credibility  of early privatization  in Eastern Europe) by  subjecting  each
enterprises'  privatization  plans  to  the  approval  of  the  Privatization  Commission
which  also  reviews  their  assets. Although  corporate  governance  might  seem  to  be
an issue  since  the  Mongolian  privatization  program  is a "diffuse  shareholding"
approach,  creating  suitable  core investor  groups  or intermediaries  like the
Polish  mutual  funds  in the  Mongolian  context  would  also  be a  problem. Because
of employee  preferences  and  an inclination  to invest  in local  firms,  many  would
probably  become  employee  or  community-owned,  but  there  is  no  reason  to  assume
that  alternative  core  investor  groups  will  not  develop  once  secondary  trading
begins.
2/  According  to  some  proposals,  employees  would  also  be  able  to  buy  shares
for  vouchers  at  the  price  fixed  by  the  Commission:  see  Murrell  et.al (1992).
I0/ Space  is  inadequate  to  discuss  the  pros  and  cons  of  Mongolia's
privatization  program  relative  to other  possible  methods. See,  for  example,
Kraay  (1992),  Milanovic(1991).12
Another  aspect  of  the  program  is  that  it  assigns  the  valuation  of
enterprises to the stock market and minimizes  the importance of bureaucratic
valuation.  The initial valuation of assets by the Privatization Commission was
an accounting exercise to determine the number of coupons to be issued.  It was
not fixed or binding, since those  values could change in the  market according to
supply and demand and without reservation prices for assets.  The announcement
effect of the initial price can, of course,  be a real one in a society  that does
not  have  experience  with  market  prices  and  has  a  long  tradition  of
administratively determined  prices. With respect  to  stock  market valuation,  some
researchers  (Tirole,  1991) argue that these markets are not likely to function
properly in the transition period.  However, somehow the enterprises need to be
valued and, as pointed out by Kraay (1992), "  if some kind of a stock market is
not used to value enterprises for the privatization process, what organization
will?".
One important caveat  is  needed however.  It  is  not clear that  privatization
in the Mongolian context implies a swift transfer to private owners of the full
set  of rights  normally assumed to accompany ownership.  The  creation of  effective
corporate governance is a three stage process  - voucher  issue, auctions, and
shareholder consiolidation through secondary  trading and, as described  below, no
company has gone through this  entire process.  Further, until price, market and
foreign  exchange  liberalization are  well  advanced,  such rights  will  remain
circumscribed, and there are reports of theoretically privatized enterprises
still receiving production instructions from state bodies.W 11 In addition, land
that the enterprises are built upon would still be owned by the state.  It is
also  possible  that  many  enterprises  will  have  negative  equity  unless  the
government writes off their  debt to commercial  banks.  In  this case,  shareholders
have  control, at  least in  theory, but  against  the background  of  zero real
ownership.
.1/  Murrell at al  (1992).13
IV.  Slowina the Headlong Rush: July 1991 - February 1992
The  progress  of  reforms  after  July  1991  was  slower  than  initially
announced.  Probably this was inevitable.  At the beginning of 1991, the Soviet
financial assistance that had averaged 30 percent of GDP between 1985 and 1990
totally  dried  up,  causing  the  economy  to deteriorate  throughout  the  year.
Following the dissolution of the CMEA,  foreign trade declined dramatically.
Exports fell from $  795.8 million in 1989 to $  444.8 million in 1990 and to $
346.5 million in 1991.  Likewise imports fell from $  1.53 billion in 1989 to  $
782.8  million in 1990 and to $  391.5 million in 1991.  Relative to 1989, exports
therefore  fell by  56 percent  and imports by  a whopping 75 percent.  Severe
shortages of almost all inputs, as well as of consumer goods, resulted in lower
output across all sectors and GDP fell by about 16.5  percent in 1991.
Modern Mongolia had never faced such a crisis.  It forced the government
to reduce the speed of reforms and increase administrative controls over the
ecornomy. In order to guarantee the supply of goods and agricultural produce for
the domestic market, state orders were maintained.  The government awarded a 25
percent rise in the minimum wage for state enterprise employees and introduced
anti-monopoly legislation which set a framework for  price controls applied to a
large  number  of  goods  (and  including  those  in  the  private  sector).  The  growth
of  private  activities  also  slowed,  as  continued  state  orders  further  constrained
the availability of basic inputs to the private sector.
Privatization  Despite some slowdown relative to earlier plans - it was
now anticipated that it would take at least two years to privatize - Mongolia's
progress  in this area still was rapid compared with that in price and market
reform.  There  was  considerable  progress,  particularly  in  small  scale
privatization.  By the beginning of February 1992, some 80 percent of all small
enterprises were in private hands.  A  secondary market for red vouchers had
developed and it seems that it  valued vouchers at about 30  percent of their face
value  (Tugrik 300 per voucher or 900 per holder).  Sales of red vouchers by a
three-person family would have yielded  Tugrik 2,700, about half of a year's
average salary.14
Another  achievement  was to  prepare  couimunications  and  other  arrangements
for large  scale  privatization. Seven  brokerage  houses  were established,  and
special  provisions  were  negotiated  to  dedicate  Mongolia's  very  limited  telephone
facilities  to the bidding process at specified times.LA  Meanwhile, the
Privatization  Commission  began  to  advertise  through  the  press  and  the  radio  about
upcoming  privatization  plans.
A  high  degree  of  market  liberalization  is  usually  considered  as  a  necessary
precondition  for  privatization  to be effective.Al3  Especially  in  highly  planned
economies,  however,  some  have  argued  that  a  considerable  degree  of  private  sector
activity  is a precondition  for liberalized  markets to work in a reasonably
competitive  manner.!A'  Indeed,  these two arguments  were reflected  in policy
debates  during  July  1991  - February  1992. The  opposition  called  for  rapid  price
liberalization  so that  privatization  could  go ahead  quickly. Government  argued
that  the  private  sector  and  market  institutions  needed  to develop  first. This
also reflected  the different  constraints  and incentives  the government  and
opposition  were  facing,  as well  as greatly  diverging  points  of view  within  the
HPRP,  in  particular  concerning  the  social  reaction  to  price  increases  which  were
made more dramatic  by the tighter  external  constraints  on Mongolia.  For the
first  time the  MPRP was facing  serious  electoral  competition  and had to gain
12/  According  to some  reports,  this  required  side-payments  to employees  of
the  telephone  company.
13/  Two arguments  are  usually  made: (i)  private  activity  may not  improve
efficiency  if guided  by the  wrong  set  of relative  prices,  and (ii)
privatization  requires  purchasers  of enterprises  to appreciate  their  potential
in undistorted  markets. In the  Mongolian  context,  the  latter  argument  is
sometimes  countered  by the  argument  that  the  enterprises  have cost  the  new
owners  nothing  because  of sale  through  vouchers. This  abstracts  from  the
trading  of vouchers  and shares  for  cash  in the  period  before  markets  are  fully
reformed.
14/  In this  respect  Mongolia's  program  resembled  the  Soviet  Shatalin  500  day
program  which  also  stressed  privatization  over  price  liberalization.  One
argument  for  this  sequence  in Shatalin's  plan  was to absorb  a  money  overhang
through  sales  of  public  assets  and so  to  promote  macro-stability  needed  for
effective  operation  of liberalized  markets. This  argument  cannot  apply  to
Mongolia,  as assets  were sold  for  vouchers  not for  cash. More recently,  the
same  concern  about  the  tension  between  rapid  macro  and  price  policies  versus
slow  supply-side  measures  has surfaced  again  in connection  with Russia's
reforms  although  the  money  overhang  has been  inflated  away.15
support  to stay in power.  Partly  through  their  dealings  with international
agencies  and  analysts,  the  cabinet,  including  the  prime  minister  and  almost  all
of the  ministers  belonging  to the  MPRP  which  was  managing  the  daily  running  of
the  country,  was  more aware  of the  size  of the  adjustment  and  the  harshness  of
the necessary  measures.  Members felt that they had already implemented  a
credible  reform  package,  and  that  new  measures  should  be  put  in  place  gradually.
More  importantly,  they  viewed  further  radical  reforms  as  politically  unfeasible
in the  face  of upcoming  elections. The other  small  parties  in the  cabinet,  as
well  as a sizeable  portion  of MPRP  deputies  in the  parliament,  argued  that the
reason for continued  poor economic  situation  was insufficient  reforms,  and
pressed  for new measures.  Given that opposition  mainly  consisted  of parties
advocating  reform,  they could not have argued otherwise,  and their optimal
strategy  was to blame  the government  for  not  pressing  ahead  with reforms  more
rapidly. On the  other  hand,  a hankering  for  the  old  socialist  system  remained
in still  other  sections  of the  NPRP.
One  particularly  important  development  in October  1991  was a clear  sign
that the market economies  and international  organizations  were prepared  to
support  reforms  through  foreign  assistance. Pledges  of foreign  aid (including
INF  and  World  Bank loans)  for  $150  million,  equivalent  to  about  1S%  of  GDP,  were
made  at the  Tokyo  meeting  in  May 1991. While  a  direct  comparison  is difficult,
this  might  have  been  equivalent  to  half of the  previous  Soviet  aid  flow.
V.  Pickina  UD the  Pace:  Reforms  after  February  1992
Pressured  by the collapse  in 1991 and by the opposition,  Mongolia's
government  deepened  the  reforms  in  the  first  quarter  of 1992.  This  move  may  also
have  reflected  the  fact  that  the  flow  of external  aid  and  loans  was  conditional
upon further  reforms.  In the  beginning  of March,  with the exception  of few
goods,  almost  all  prices  were "liberalized";  however,  they  remained  subject  to
negotiated  price ceilings  administered  by local price commissions.  A new
constitution  declared  that "Mongolia  shall  have an economy  based  on different
forms  of property".16
The  most important  event,  however,  was  the  opening  of the  Mongolian  Stock
Exchange  on February  7, with the public  offering  of 3 large  enterprises  for
vouchers. After  its  opening,  the  stock  exchange  continuously  increased  trading
volume. By the  beginning  of June,  the  number  of shares  sold  for blue coupons
reached  468,400,  with a value of more than Tugrik 100 million (Table  3 and
Figures  1 and 2).  Within  four months  there  were 34 companies  listed  on the
exchange  and their  privatization  was  moving  as planned. As of June 2,  21 of
these  were fully  privatized. The list included  some  prominent  establishments
such  as Ulaanbaatar  Hotel  and  Mongol  Ceramics.
The provincial distribution of shares in the 21 privatized companies  is
shown  in  Table  4.  About  49  percent  of the  shares  of fully  privatized  companies
were acquired  by people  living  in Ulaanbaatar  while 51 percent  were sold to
people in other areas.  Although  Ulaanbaatar's  share :_xceeded  its population
proportion  of 25 percent, this is still  a noteable  achievement  considering
Mongolia's  poor communications  and the vastness  of the country.  The simple
process  of auctioning  off  equities  in successive  blocks  seems  to  have led  to a
convergence  of bidding  as indicated  by Figure  3 for the Ulaanbaatar  HotelLI,
but data also suggest that the announcement  effect from the initial book
valuation  may  have  played  a role  in settling  the  equilibrium  price.
As expected,  the  use of vouchers  also  led to diffused  share  ownership.
For  example,  in  the  case  of  Ulaanbaatar  Hotel,  12,000  people  obtained  shares  and
the  largest  individual  owner  held  only  0.07  percent  of  the  total.  (Table  5). The
new  owners  had  not  yet  become  effective  - as of  June  1, a shareholder's  meeting
had  yet  to  be held,  the  Board  of  Directors  and  the  management  of the  Hotel  having
been elected  by staff  and  employees  prior  to  privatization.
IS/  The  Mongolian  bidding  process  is far  simpler  than  the  Czech  system  which
involves  recontracting.17
TABLE  3
STOCK  TRADING  VOLUME  AND  VALUE
Date  Number  of Shares  Voucher  Value
92.02.07  15,542  3,051,900
92.02.11  28,940  6,225,244
92.02.18  44,060  10,060,968
92.02.25  101,950  22,484,000
92.03.03  189,160  42,061,890
92.03.10  232,592  49,440,700
92.03.17  228,665  50,750,956
92.03.24  211,020  48,031,795
92.03.31  242,640  55,368,105
92.04.07  199,374  52,065,500
92.04.14  214,700  53,159,000
92.04.21  216,101  65,817,790
92.04.28  213,627  71,629,482
92.05.05  182,000  60,057,417
92.05.12  225,563  75,627,086
92.05.19  258,265  66,1-7,250
92.05.26  240,758  48,544,046
92.06.02  468,400  100,408,500
SUB  TOTAL  3,509,357  880,921,629
TOTAL  ESOP  942,960  94,296,000
TOTAL  4,452,317  975,217,629
Source:  Mongolian  Stock  Exchange18
Table 4
SPREAD  OF SHARES  BY PROVINCES
(Fully  Privatized  Companies)
Companies  MSH-001 UaZ-002  ULN-03  TLO-005  JLN-006 UBH-007 HRD-008 MNH-009 BNU-012 HEZ-010 MSV-011 AGA.012
Aimuaks  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12
1. Arhangai  1282  25804  5815  3537  310  35268  3039  14073  19223  1623  5039  3213
2.  Nalaih  2564  64374  6529  1267  591  15550  403  5777  7697  846  284  4606
3. Bayan-Ulgi  4398  17720  17192  206  4080  14970  0  11311  19917  35  0  882
4.  Zavhan  3962  7414  11191  1779  989  18783  435  20163  7846  98  18  2591
5. Gobi-Altai  1544  1948  6513  1616  48  20920  786  21172  10283  803  932  3576
6.  Bayaihongor  1757  8950  5934  1311  262  14391  618  14434  6114  528  1184  1903
7.  Huvsgul  806  9166  5779  1320  3935  9026  657  9628  9703  508  594  1161
8. Dundgobi  692  5199  7773  1135  1216  10260  1433  13894  6614  402  381  1761
9.  Dornod  661  11425  9580  368  2279  4846  206  2641  6147  108  109  1648
10.  Darhan  443  10916  9187  1524  427  6740  704  7345  7390  25  365  1514
11. Selenge  91  3181  6487  752  838  10269  356  5190  5731  643  36  2344
12. Uva  468  7344  5822  2086  0  6075  642  9663  7037  8  517  1131
13. Uvuhangai  1882  7219  6586  544  502  9094  483  9080  4203  311  980  247
14. Drdenet  1205  10927  3919  359  920  6706  4187  1685  5957  30  70  396
15. Dormogobi  1465  5720  6308  3541  114  9013  1146  6627  3832  760  449  933
16. Hovd  1124  3453  2390  728  424  10001  145  9295  2306  39  66  745
17. Tuv  572  4962  4606  1145  507  6995  227  3327  3667  194  80  1315
18. Sukhbaatar  3669  3743  5471  1895  1870  7293  1012  6174  2458  101  149  317
19. Baganuur  276  1894  5616  647  0  4558  102  1068  3651  0  0  498
20.  Henti  40  7108  5382  461  72  5526  369  4849  2310  463  199  451
21. Bulgan  610  2340  3555  1304  0  4765  773  9026  2138  283  894  884
22. Umnugobi  502  754  2088  942  136  4209  518  4691  3643  386  778  673
23. Ulaanbaatar  41602  54066  178574  34527  47664  169571  48039  109518  175238  25928  91876  53213
Total  71615  275627  335297  63000  67184  404829  66280  300631  323065  34122  105000  86302
Total of
Traded  53835  252387  314157  55720  52374  357439  53050  270041  305635  31952  89440  78332
ESOP  17780  23240  21140  7280  14810  47390  13230  30590  17430  2170  15960  7980
(continued)
Source: Mongolian  Stock  Exchange.19
Table 4 (continued)
SPREAD  OF SHARES  BY PROVINCES
(Fully  Privitazied  Companies)
Companies  UROL.014 UGU-015 USU-016 ATR-017 MZR-018  HIE-019 DRU-021  S04037  CSU-004  Total  %  Share per
_____  - of Total  Capita
Aimaks  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21
1. Arhangai  503  1740  1054  3742  2291  1192  5121  1868  3030  138767  5.04  6.25
2. Nalaih  333  1192  1162  929  636  421  3369  1336  1703  131569  4.78  1.96
3. Bayan-Ulgi  0  2012  112  4401  35  1445  5973  2222  21  106932  3.88  3.64
4. Zavhan  383  955  96  1799  2328  5579  16134  1314  367  104224  3.78  4.99
5. Gobi-Altai  308  1971  693  584  2449  39  4232  4859  849  86125  3.13  4.49
6. Bayanhongor  367  1291  483  2398  1353  1312  8405  2175  1025  76195  2.77  3.48
7. Huvagul  416  3129  892  2484  2184  919  7217  867  918  74309  2.70  3.32
8. Dundgobi  116  1051  695  1496  1571  1849  7247  4723  1278  70786  2.57  4.19
9. Domod  140  1487  606  636  1182  1778  12968  318  182  59275  2.15  1.54
10. Darhan  68  1830  581  2502  2281  1185  2624  455  1043  59149  2.15  .74
11. Selonge  20  1755  2  2410  741  710  8402  385  113  50462  1.83  2.43
12. Uvs  0  80  496  2340  786  1053  4020  771  681  51020  1.85  2.00
13. Uvurhangai  242  788  204  437  2096  512  4414  471  624  50919  1.85  3.09
14. Erdenet  183  1120  200  558  1149  1449  1810  5584  619  49033  1.78  1.01
15. Dornogobi  451  464  670  650  1801  213  2218  1800  6423  54598  1.98  5.25
16.  Hovd  109  756  867  1165  1869  22  11438  418  313  47878  1.74  1.98
17.  Tuv  135  551  203  2484  8518  289  2141  150  232  42300  1.54  2.32
18.  Sukbastar  66  604  56  1391  256  672  4168  412  655  42432  1.54  2.47
19. Baganuur  56  285  468  2810  492  226  817  15972  343  39779  1.44  2.26
20. Henti  203  663  526  600  845  1742  4295  1095  1055  32254  1.39  2.28
21. Bulgan  458  689  473  787  537  1624  2161  1681  227  35209  1.28  2.55
22. Umnugobi  226  247  542  147  818  309  4374  682  240  26905  .98  1.8
23. Ulaanbaatar  16900  50725  31362  67732  44489  28255  62864  7796  30731  1371110  48.80  4.32
Total  21683  75385  42443  104482  80707  53000  186412  57354  52672  2807090
Total
Traded  18463  44165  34043  82432  79657  42500  156662  49864  46442  1964992
ESOP  3220  31220  8400  22050  1050  10500  29750  7490  6230  26394020
TABLE  5
TRADING  DATA  ON ULAANBAATAR  HOTEL  INC.'s  SHARES
as of June 7, 1992
Total Issued  335,297 shares
Esop  :  21,140 shares  (5.71  percent)
Total of Traded:  314,157 shares  (84.85  percent)
Trading  Number of  Voucher  Share  Price
Day  Shares  Value  Hi  Low  Average
February  2, 1992  9,582  2,395,500  250  250  250
February 11, 1992  22,640  5,345,244  252  210  231
February 18, 1992  12,115  3,150,351  350  251  270
February 25, 1992  40,000  10,200,000  261  250  254
March  3, 1992  45,000  11,490,000  259  250  254
March  10, 1992  75,000  18,970,000  259  250  252
March  17, 1992  65,000  16,400,000  259  250  252
March  24, 1992  45,000  11,445,000  255  252  254
TOTAL  314,157  79,396,095  - -
SHAREHOLDER DATA
Total Issued: 335,297 shares
Total Number of Shareholders: 12,700
Esop: 302 people obtained shares through the ESOP scheme
Number of Shares per Shareholder: 26
The Names of People With the Highest Number of Shares and the Province They
Reside in:
1. G. Damdin,  269 shares, Dornogobi Aimak
2. J. Narmandah,  245 shares, Ulaanbaatar
3. S. BAyraa, 243 shares, Dornogobi Aimak
4. N. Ouin,  207 shares, Ulaanbaatar
5. J. Purev,  200 shares, Dornogobi Aimak
Source: Mongolian Stock Exchange21
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VI.  Fast or Slow?  Some Considerations and the Case of Mongolia
Several factors have been advanced  to account for various  countries'
propensities to adopt radical reform programs or to opt instead for a phased
process of incremental reforms.
(i)  Organizational and  Institutional  Can-acitv.  The  evolutionary  approach towards
system transformationL6 1 stresses the need to organically develop the new out
of the old.  It points to the depth and pervasiveness of the changes required,
in behavior, institutions and information flows in  countries long isolated from
the global economy.  It emphasizes the costs (including  social instability and
the possible reversal of reform) of attempting to superimpose market structures
too rapidly.  The  institutional capacity and market-related  skill base of a
reforming  country  may  simply  be  too  low  for  an  abrupt  transformation  to  the
market.121
On the  other  hand, the  experience  of  reforming socialist countries  suggests
several  factors that  encourage the  adoption  of  a radical  transformation strategy:
ii) A political transition towards democracy and the rejection of Communism as
an  externally imposed system, coupled  with concern to render reform irreversible
before the process is hopelessly politicised weere factors spurring reform in
much of Eastern Europe.
iii) A clear model for the transformed society  (such as Western Europe) sets
standards for reform and accelerates it;
iv)  Severe  macroeconomic imbalances  or shocks  force  swift corrective  measures  and
a  choice between  liberalizing markets versus  returning to tighter controls.
Shocks can be of domestic or external origin.  In many cases they have been
associated with the  CMEA trade  and  payments shock  which is  estimated to  have been
directly responsible  for about half  of the 20' decline  in Eastern  Europe's
16/  The evolutionary approach is put forward by Murrell  (1990);  see also
Kornai  (1992).
17/  To take one example, without an established accounting and auditing
profession and lacking credit-appraisal capability, moving to a market-based
financial system risks a serious solvency crisis.  To take another, without
tax administration capacity, relaxing direct government control over
enterprise surpluses risks a fiscal crisis.25
recorded GDP in 199 0-9 1IA'  Even though their CNEA shock was, to some degree,
self-inflicted,L9' when  it  came,  the  East  European  countries  saw  little
alternative  to  an  economic  opening  involving  compreh3nsive price  and  trade
liberalization and swift moves towards current convertibility.  Non-CMEA trade
already accounted for half of total trade in the more open of these countries,
however.
These factors are relevant to Mongolia also, and its experience offers
further insights into how they interact to speed or slow reforms.
(i)  Organizational and Institutional Caoacitv.  Market infrastructure and the
institutional  capacity  for  a  market  economy  is  particularly  inadequate  in
Mongolia, especially relative to the more open of the East European countries.
This has constrained the speed of reforms in many ways.  Although the need for
radical reform  was widely appreciated early  on,  there was not a widespread
awareness of what radical reform actually meant, even within the government.
This limited the extent to which the actual reforms can be said to have been
supported by a broad consensus, and almost surely contributed to inconsistencies
between reform plans and their implementation.
(ii)  Political Factors.  The urge to transform the economy was initially led by
a reform minded group within and outside of the MPRP who realized that with the
collapse of the Soviet Union Mongolia would not be able to sustain its economy.
As Soviet aid halved in 1990, the Mongolian government began to move away from
the official ideology of the MPRP, which still continued official adherence to
socialism through 1990 and 1991.  In fact, a law passed in January 1991 banned
political parties from operating  in  government  organs and  required  all government
officers,  including  the president  and vice  president,  to  drop  their party
18/  There is no rigorous way of disentangling the effects of the several
factors that have contributed to Eastern Europe's economic contraction.  This
is a "best guess" estimate based on the outcome of a World Bank-IMF conference
on the Macroeconomic Situation in Eastern Europe in July, 1992.
19/  Following political changes, East European countries moved as fast as
possible to strengthen ties with the West and reduce those to the USSR.  This
included a rejection of the CMEA system, despite the high short-run costs.26
affiliations.  - The reformers  saw  a quick  switch  to the  market  economy  as the
only  alternative  to  communism. Indeed,  was  not  Big  Brother  also  shifting  to the
market?
Reform  was  also  intertwined  with  a  resurgence  of  nationalism  and  a  desire
to  assert  independence  from  the Soviet  Union.  The  coalition  government  formed
following  the  first  multi-party  elections  sounded  much  more nationalistic  than
its  predecessor,  often  suggesting  that  a new economic  structure  would  minimise
foreign  dependency  and  reverse  past "colonialism".  This  lent  credibility  to  the
reform  movement,  and helped  to mobilize  support.  The combination  of these
factors  - reduced  Soviet  assistance,  ideological  fragmentation  of  the  MPRP,  the
insulation  of technocrats  in the government,  and some degree  of nationalist
resurgence  - allowed  reformers  to  propose  wideranging  reform  measures. But  with
very  limited  general  understanding  of the  nature  and  implications  of reform,  it
would  be  hard to  argue  that  a  broad  national  concensus  existed  on the  specifics
of the reform  process.
A  number  of political  factors  appear to have slowed  down the reform
process,  reative  to  its  optimistic  announcement.  As  reforms  unfolded  against  the
worsening  macroeconomic  scenario,  the size of the needed  adjustment,  and the
potential social  disruption,  particularly  in urban areas, also became more
apparent  to  reformers  within  the  government.  This  implied  the  need  to  make  some
difficult choices concerning the pace of  reform and the distribution  of
adjustment  costs.9'  At certain times, government  therefore  appeared  to be
reforming  less  vigorously  than  demanded  by some  sections  of  parliament  and  more
slowly  than  required  by its  initial  "big  bang"  approach. But  with  the  upcoming
elections  in late  June  1992,  parliament  was  also  delaying  the  implementation  of
certain reforms that would have an immediate  impact  on the welfare of the
population.  For  example,  a  badly  needed  sales  tax  law  to  increase  revenues,  long
20/  Heaton (1992).
21/  For  example,  Decree  355  still  prohibits  the  export  of raw  materials  with
the  objective  of protecting  the  processing  industry  - even  as  price
liberalization  and  privatization  are in  process.27
ready in draft, is still waiting in the parliament.  A degree of politicization
of the reform process - inevitable within a democratic society - has therefore
slowed reforms.  Agricultural interests in parliament resisted the abolition of
existing structures in the course of rural privatization - but at the same time
lobbied against state orders for farm products.
International political considerations may also have played some role in
the political calculus.  Mongolia needs to retain the good offices of China, on
which it  is  heavily dependent for transport routes  and which could  become a  major
trading partner.Wa  This, too, may influence the speed of the reforms or the
estimates of the reformers as to how much social disruption would be tolerable
without further political repercussions.
(iii)  Was There A  "Model"?  Unlike Eastern Europe  (which looked to Western
Europe) and  Southern China and Vietnam  (which look to the Asian  "tigers"),
Mongolia's distinctive  geographic situation and  natural resource structure  makes
it far  harder  to  identify a  clear and plausible  model  for the  transformed
economy.
(iv)  Macroeconomic Constraints: The Shrinkina Resource Envelove  Mongolia's
moves  towards  comprehensive  transformation  were  clearly  spurred  by  the
realization  that the deteriorating  Soviet system would not  long be  able  to
continue to  support its  economy. However, its  geography  and  economic orientation
made disengagement from  the Soviet  economy and  integration into  the global  market
economy very difficult.  Some simple comparisons with Bulgaria, the most CMEA-
dependent country in Eastern Europe, are illustrative.  The terms of trade loss
to Bulgaria  from the end of  the CMEA was estimated  at 12% of  GDP,21 while
Mongolia's loss  of Soviet aid  alone was 30% of  GDP.  Thirty  percent of  Bulgaria's
exports  were  for  convertible  currency,  and  these  represented  15%  of  GDP.
Mongolia's convertible currency  exports were  barely 1%  of  GDP.  Bulgaria also  did
22/  August 1991 marked the first visit ever to Mongolia by China's head of
state.
23/  Gelb and Gray, p38.28
not face Mongolia's severe transport difficulties in increasing trade with the
market economies.
Between 1988 and 1991 Mongolia's exports fell by nearly half in dollar
terms, and the impact was aggravated by a sharp contraction in the financeable
current account deficit, from over $1 billion to only $100  million.  The effect
was to cut imports to only 30W of their 1988  value, causing  pervasive shortages
and  supply bottlenecks  and  further  contracting production  levels.  Without
allowing for terms of trade effects, a total cutoff of external funding would
have forced imports back to less than one quarter of their 1988 level (from  54*
of 1988 GDP to only 13%), less than fuel imports alone in 1988 and roughly
equivalent to consumer goods imports in that year.  Sharp output falls in all
sectors in 1991,  led  by construction and industry,  further reduced  GDP which fell
by 16.5  percent.  By early 1992,  urban unemployment had risen to about 20* of the
labor force.
An output decline of 16.5  percent superimposed on an import cut  equivalent
to 40  percent of 1988  GDP, and allowing for a  halving of commodity  exports, would
imply a cut in absorption of 47.5 percent of 1988 GDP.  Almost all of this cut
would have been felt in the urban economy, which, by 1990, supported 57* of the
population.  Lacking the transport and distribution systems to rapidly open new
mines and reorient exports to world markets  (and  lacking also familiarity with
these markets), Mongolia's  considerable mineral  wealth could not  rapidly be
redeployed.  In  the short-medium run,  pastoral agriculture is therefore the  main
potential source  of  foreign  exchange - but  paradoxically, this  traditional sector
is the least import-dependent of all.
The impact of the cutoff of Soviet aid and trade disruption is simulated
in Annex 1 using a small computable general equilibrium model, which seeks to
strike  a compensating balance between flexibility and rigidities in constraining
the possibilities of adjustment.  The model is calibrated to roughly conform to
the structural characteristics of Mongolia's economy.  The results suggest that
the rural sector is reasonably well-insulated from external shocks, but that the
urban sector cor.tracts  sharply, faced with a combination of supply and demand29
shocks  as  essential  inputs  and  urban  incomes  both  fall.  This  induces
catastrophic declines in welfare.  One response scenario explored by the model
is  that of  massive reverse migration to rural areas,  but even this leaves welfare
indicators at less than half their pre-shock levels.  The model suggests that
preventing a decline in welfare of  more than 20*  would require aid flows of  about
15* of GDP, a level not too far out of line with pledges given at the 1991 Tokyo
meeting.24/
Even  accepting  the  proposition that  macroeconomic shocks  tend to  accelerate
reform, Mongolia's situation raises the question of how far this is likely to
apply.  Beyond a certain point, as the resource envelope tightens and squeezes
away the margin above subsistence, the more difficult it will be to sustain an
orderly pattern of reform.  In the extreme, a tightening resource constraint
could force a country like  Mongolia (or,  indeed,  some of the states  of the  former
Soviet Union) to shift from a planned socialist system to a rationed "wartime
economy" despite intentions to shift to a market system.  It may be significant
that even well-established market economies tend to resort to controls rather
than market-based  adjustment  when  faced  with  national  emergencies.  In
24/  As noted by a number of analysts, falling measured output in the process
of socialist transformation does not necessarily imply falling real
consumption levels and lower consumer welfare.  Nevertheless, the structural
characteristics of Mongolia's economy suggest that a sharp cut in external
support and trade losses would result in a severe contraction of the urban
economy and have major implications for income distribution, even with a
successful radical reform program.  Measures to strengthen and
institutionalize the social safety net were already evident by 1990, with the
creation of unemployment insurance and the initiation of rationing.
25/  In addition to the political factors, a number of economic arguments may
be advanced in favor of responding to national emergencies (such  as war or
natural or other disasters) that threaten a dramatic cut in the availability
of products for consumption and investment through direct interventions rather
than using the price mechanism and indirect controls:
(i)  Without knowing the shapes of demand and supply curves, it is
difficult to set taxes, subsidies and transfers to achieve a desired
reallocation of resources that is very different from the original one.
(ii)  The outcome of any market equilibrium reflects a lengthy process of
firms and consumers "feeling their way" towards the best allocation of
resources.  Faced with a radically new set of incentives, economic agents will
need some time to rearrange their responses.  Together with  (i),  this means
that any price-guided adjustment to the emergency will be erratic and costly.
(iii)  The particular set of price interventions and income transfers
needed to achieve the desired outcome may not be enforceable unless agents are
(continued...)30
addition,  severely  reduced  resources  could  cause  social  unrest  on a scale  that
prevented  any coherent  process  of systemic  reform.
Such  a  relationship  between  resources  and  transformation  is  shown  in  Figure
4.  With  no  external  shocks,  reasonably  good  performance  along  path  1  blunts  the
impetus  to  change  a socialist  system  in  a radical,  and  perhaps  risky,  way. This
corresponds  perhaps to China after 1978.  Path 2 represents  a typical  East
European  country  - shocks  contribute  to  a sense  that  the  old  system  is  breaking
down,  and impel  rapid  reform. Path 3 shows  a highly  constrained  country  like
Mongolia, facing a  far larger shock and with fewer avenues of short-term
adjustment  through  market  mechanisms. The  difficulty  facing  such  a country  is
how  to implement  a rational  reform  and  liberalization  process  that  will  enable
it to escape  from a low-level  crisis-rationed  equilibrium  without incurring
unacceptable  social  costs. An important  role for foreign  aid --  and one  well
recognized  by Mongolian officials --  is then to preserve the capacity  to
implement  market  reforms,  and  speed  the  transition  to tO.
It  is  still  too  early  to  tell  whether  Mongolia's  experience  offers  lessons
to other  transitional  countries. Certainly  the  innovative  privatization  may  do
so,  particularly  for  the  smaller  Asian  republics  of the  former  Soviet  Union,  but
formally  privatizing  state  property  is really  an easy  part of reform. Making
companies  profitable  and finding  new jobs for dismissed  workers is the real
challenge.  Mongolia's  privatization  has  not  yet  led  to  restructuring,  there  have
been  no  bankruptcies,  and  no  layoffs.  These  may  come  in  the  future,  once  share
trading  concentrates  ownership  and  provides  an  effective  locus  for  corporate
2/( ...  continued)
controlled  directly,  or it  may involve  high enforcement  costs  or confront
severe  informational  problems. Transforming  socialist  countries  face  a
special  case  of this  problem:  (iiia)  It  may not  be  possible  to rapidly  enforce
financial  discipline  on the  economic  agents  which  is sufficient  to rapidly
achieve  a normal  market  solution.
For  all  of these  reasons,  a market-based  solution  to an emergency  may
not  be credible. This,  in turn,  will  greatly  increase  the  costs  of trying  to
apply  it.
For  more discussion,  see  Bolton  and  Farrell (1990),  Weitzman
(1974),(1978),  Yohe (1977),  and  Bennett  (1989). We are indebted  to Barry
Ickes  for  drawing  our attdention  to this literature.31
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governance.  A possible lesson for other countries is that voucher schemes are
a  feasible  method of transferring  asset ownership rapidly,  but that  they are  only
a  stage  in  the  development  of  effective  ownership.  Without  an  adequate
regulatory framework for capital markets (which  Mongolia does  not yet have), the
trading of securities which is needed to concentrate ownership and provide an
effective locus of shareholder control risks  manipulations that could damage the
credibility of the reform.  Along with other countries in transition Mongolia
has  already  experienced  financial  scandals,  connected  with  losses  from  the
trading of foreign exchange.
While small enterprises have been privatized almost completely, they are
still under  extensive constraints and instructions as to what activities  to
engage in, and without clear title to their land, investment in such firms will
probably be limited.
Another lesson Mongolia may offer for reforming countries is that voters
are liable to shy away from radical reformers when faced with growing shortages
and a collapsing economy, even if the collapse is due to factors outside the
government's control.  In June, 1992, the MPRP was overwhelmingly returned in
general elections, capturing 72 of 76 parliamentary seats.  This does not mean
the reversal of reforms.  With the changes in the former USSR, a return to past
is impossible.  It probably  means  slower reforms, and  greater attention  to
preserving as far as possible the social welfare systems and sense of economic
security  that characterised  the previous  system  - for  example, by  delaying
adjustment in the enterprise sector.  Like Mongolia, some ex-Soviet republics
face output losses and a drastic tightening of their resource envelopes.  This
could  reduce their ability to  liberalize and implement comprehensive  reform
programs, and strengthen impulses towards reimposing direct controls.33
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Appendix  1
External  Shocks  in  a Simple  Model  of a  Moncolia-Like  Economv
The  model  developed  below  focusses  on  three  aspects  of  Mongolia"  B  economy:
(i) dualistic economic structure, (ii)  widespread  social protection  and a
tendency,  characteristic  of socialist  countries,  to equalize  living  standards,
and (iii)  the  problem  of adjusting  to a  cutoff  of  aid  and  trade  disruption  with
CMEA  partners.
Economic  Dualism.  Since its incorporation  into the Soviet sphere  of
influence  in  the  1920s,  the  Mongolian  economy  has  evolved  into  two  broad  sectors
with very different  characteristics.  Traditional  pastoral  farming  is largely
self-sufficient,  but  the  modern  urban  economy  that  now  employs  the  bulk  of the
population  is highly dependent  on intermediate  imports and capital goods.
Imports  were  funded  in  the  past  by a combination  of  mineral  exports  (almost  all
to the  USSR)  and Soviet  aid, flows  of which  have exceeded  30*  of GDP for  long
periods.  Intermediates,  in particular  fuels,  accounted  for over half of all
imports,  with  the  remainder  split  equally  between  capital  and  consumer  products.
Aid has supported  a high rate of investment,  partly in the form of turnkey
projects.
Social  Protection.  At the  same  time,  economic  dualism  has  not  translated
into intense  social  dualism.  Comprehensive  health  and education  systems  and
social  transfers  received  by a high  propo-tion  of the  population  have extended
the benefits of the modern economy quite broadly.  Although the monetary
expenditures  of those  in the traditional  sector  have been less than those  of
urban  residents,  as  a  first  approximation  living  standards  can  be  assumed  to  have
been  broadly  comparable  in  town  and  countryside.  This  tendency  to  equalize  rural
and urban living standards (even  if incompletely)  is also notable in other
socia'list  countries.35
CMEA  Dependence.  As  a result  of aid  and  exports  to  the  USSR,  Mongolia  was
a rather open economy as measured by import-GDP  ratios;  nevertheless  this
situation  was  almost  totally  dependent  on the  Soviet  Union. Mongolia's  economy
was  almost  totally  integrated  into  the  CNEA  system,  with  far  fewer  trade  links
outside  it than the economies  of Eastern  Europe. 1 Transport  and logistical
barriers  make a rapid  reorientation  of trade  exceptionally  difficult,  at least
in the short term.  Further,  the infrastructural  requirements  for further
development  of mineral  deposits  are  great,  and this  limits  the speed  of their
development.  Mongolia's  possible  responses  to  an  abrupt  cutoff  of  Soviet  aid  and
to the disruption  of barter  trading  arrangements  for  its  mineral  products  are
therefore  quite  limited  in the  shorter  term.
Structure  of the  Model. The  model  in  Table  Al is  intended  to  simulate  the
consequences  of  an  aid  cutoff  and  trade  disruption  in  the  short-medium  run  --  say
one to three  years,  before  radical  changes  in  production  capacity  are  possible
but  too  long  to rely  on  accumulat'i  stocks  or reserves. Rural  output,  which  is
in  reality  the  outcome  of  complex  decisions  concerning  trading  off  current  sales
versus  a  buildup  of  herds,  is  simply  specified  exogenously  in the  model. Labor
is the only rural factor  of production.  Urban output  is modelled  as a CBS
function  of  imported  intermediates  and  domestic  value  added. The  CBS  elasticity
of  substitution  is  assumed  to  be  0.33. Urban  domestic  value-added  is  represented
by  labor  input,  since  simulations  typically  involve  underutilization  of  domestic
capital. The  model  abstracts  from  domestic  input-output  relationships.  Urban
and  rural  labor  forces  are  given,  with  the  possibility  of  intersectoral  migration
allowed  in some  simulations. A small  part of rural  output  is exported  in the
base  period,  but  urban  output  goes  to  satisfy  consumption  and  investment  needs.
Rural  incomes  (assumed  to  be received  by rural  households)  are  set  by the  value
of  rural  output. Urban  incomes  are  the  value  of  urban  gross  cutput  less  the  cost
of  imported  inputs  plus  a  transfer  from  abroad  which  represents  the  sum  of  Soviet
aid  and  income  from  mineral  exports  which  is  taken  as  exogenous.  For  simplicity,
I  Mongolia's exports to market economies  were about 1i of GDP; for
comparison,  they  were 151  of  GDP in  Bulgaria,  a "closed"  East  European  country.36
mining is treated  as a pure rent and this is separated  from rural  and urban
output. In  some  simulations  a lump-sum  tax/transfer  may  be  effected  between  the
rural  and  urban  sectors.
Rural  and  urban  demands  are  modelled  simply  as derived  from  Cobb-Douglas
utility  functions  over  rural  and  urban  goods  in  the  two  sectors  - - for  simplicity
the  model  abstracts  from  final  consumer  imports. Expressed  on a  per  head  basis,
these  utility  functions  are  used to evaluate  the  welfare  implications  of  model
simulations. Investment  demand  is treated  as a pre-specified  quantity  of the
urban  good,  which  is deducted  from total  urban  demand  for  the  urban  good when
deriving  the  utility  of urban  households. 2 The  model  is static,  and  also does
not  distinguish  government  and  private  sectors,  and  so  abstracts  from  all  fiscal
issues  of adjustment.
The  model  closes,  or  balances,  through  the  adjustment  of the  price  of the
urban  good (and  of the  price  of the  rural  good if  foreign  demand  is  not  assumed
to be infinitely  elastic).  Urban consumption  is a residual,  after taking
investment  from  urban  output. The imported  intermediate  good  is  the  numeraire,
and  in the  base  simulation  all  prices  are  defined  to  be  unity. The  equations  of
the model are shown, together  with indicators  of base structure,  which is
calibrated  to (roughly)  approximate  Mongolia  before  the  aid  and  trade  shocks.
This  simple  specification  attempts  to  strike  a  compensating  balance  between
flexibility  and  rigidity  in  constraining  the  possibilities  of  adjustment.  On  the
one  hand,  experience  to  date  with  socialist  transformation  suggests  a  good  deal
of  capacity  to  adjust  through  a  variety  of  structural  and  productivity  gains  not
easily  captured  in models of the computable  general  equilibrium  type --  for
example,  through  the  rapid  growth  of small  businesses  and improvements  is the
distribution  and  service  sectors  following  the  liberalization  of  markets.  On  the
other  hand,  the  model  allows  rather  flexible  substitution  in  demand,  and  possibly
also  in  urban  production  considering  the  small  size  of  Mongolia's  economy  and  the
2 For simplicity,  investment  demand  is therefore  included  in total  urban
demand  as derived  from  the  utility  function,  but  the level  of investment  goods
is deducted  from total  urban demand  to obtain  the level  of urban consumers,
welfare.37
very high complementarity  between  key imported  inputs (especially  fuels)  and
domestic  factors  of production.
Another  noteworthy  feature  of  the  model  is  its  calibration  to  ensure  equal
levels  of  urban  and  rural  welfare  in  the  base  period. This  reflects  the  a  priori
judgment  that  the  costs  imposed  on the  rural  sector  due  to  the  generally  urban-
centered  Marxist  development  strategy  have  been  offset  by the  access  to  urban-
based services --  including health, education, family allowances, and so on --
that  would  not otherwise  have  been  available  to  rural  households. To put this
another  way, it is assumed  that the  distribution  of Mongolia's  population  has
equilibrated,  through  urbanization,  to the  urban  development  and  modernization
permitted  by Soviet  aid  and  mineral  exports  over  a long  period.
Aid Cutoff  and  -xEort Disruption. The  first  set  of simulations  explores
the impact  of drastic  cuts in import  capacity  caused  by the ending  of Soviet
assistance  (equivalent  to 31.5* of nonmining  GDP in the base reriod) 3 plus a
halving  of mining  export  revenues  (21*  of nonmining  GDP in the base)  through
disruption. Table  A2 shows  first  the  effect  of an aid  cut  alone,  then  that  of
the cut plus export disruption,  under three assumptions  on the demand for
nonmining exports:  very elastic, somewhat  elastic,  and unit elastic (the
elasticity  of demand  for  nonmining  exports  is respectively  100,  2 and 1).  An
investment  level  of half that specified  in the base period,  or 211 of base
nonmining  GDP,  is  assumed. Three  model  outcomes  are  shown:  rural  welfare,  urban
welfare  and  non-mining  GDP  at base-year  prices,  all  relative  to  their  base-year
levels.  It should  be stressed  that the GDP measure  reported  from the model
always  excludes  export  mining,  which  is  treated  as  a  pure  rent  producing  sector.
Faced  with  a  major  supply  shock  to  the  urban  sector  with  which  they  trade,
the  welfare  of  rural  households  depends  mainly  on  how  easily  agricultural  exports
can  be  expanded. Nevertheless,  the  rural  sector  is  well-cushioned,  with  welfare
3 To avoid  the  impact  of exogenous  changes  in  mineral  exports,  all  ratios
are expressed  relative  to  GDP excluding  mining  rent.  In the  base year of the
mod&l,  mining  rent is equivalent  to 21*  of nonmining  GDP.38
levels  remaining  at  over  70W  of their  base  levels. 4 The  same  cannot  be said  for
urban households,  who see a catastrophic  fall in welfare as the simulated
environment  deteriorates. The maximum  fall in nonmining  GDP, of 30*, is of
course  concentrated  in  the  urban  economy. 5 The  model  also shows  the  importance
of  agricultural  exports  for  the  urban  sector,  as  increased  foreign  exchange  makes
possible  more intermediate  imports  and  sustains  urban  production.
What is the effect of introducing  open urban unemployment  into the
adjustment  scenario? The simulations  reported  in the lower  part of Table  A2
place 20  of the urban  labor  force  into  that category. This causes  output  to
fall further  and urban welfare levels  to decline  appreciably. As would be
expected,  the effect is smaller  when urban output is already  highly import
constrained.
Reverse  miaration.  The  emergence  of  large  rural-urban  income  differentials
would  be expected  to induce  reverse  migration  to rural  areas,  particularly  as
about  half of all urban households  are estimated (by  Mongolian  officials)  to
retain  close  ties  to the  rural  economy. Table  A3 simulates  a reverse  migration
scenario  (or  a related  possibility  of income  sharing)  to re-equalize  urban  and
rural welfare assuming an aid cutoff and mining export disruption,  with
investment  again  halved  from  base  levels. Forty  percent  of the  urban  population
returns  to rural  areas,  raising  the  population  in  the  traditional  sector  by 80%
and  reversing  decades  of  urbanization.  This  social  response  still  leaves  welfare
at below  half  of base-year  levels.
Another  response  to  the  sharp  urban  income  loss  could  be to  tax  the  rural
sector  to equalize  welfare  in the two sectors. Table  A3 shows  the  necessary
rural  tax  rate  to  be  over  50*. The  capacity  to  collect  such  a  high  tax,  and  the
real-world  consequences  for incentives  of trying to do so, are issues  not
4  Because  the shocks  are on the  supply  side,  and are matched  by falling
urban demand,  simulations  typically  involve  only fairly  small changes  in the
relative  price  of the  urban  good. Real  depreciation  is  associated  with  a terms
of trade  loss  to rural  exporters  who, faced  with falling  urban  demand,  try to
raise  exports  with foreign  demand  possibly  inelastic.
S  In reality,  the  rural  sector  is of course  also  dependent  on some  urban
intermediate  inputs  and  hence  on imports,  but  the  model  abstracts  from  this.39
considered  in the  model,  where  the  tax/transfer  is simply  modelled  as costless
and lump-sum.
Foreicrn  Aid to Facilitate  Transition. Faced  with income  losses  of the
magnitudes  indicated,  a  country  might  be  expected  to  encounter  extreme  difficulty
in  implementing  a  consistent  reform  program. Table  A4 shows  the  use  of the  model
to  derive  target  levels  of "Western"  aid 6 to sustain  an orderly,  comprehensive,
transition  to  a private  market  economy. It  is assumed  (quite  arbitrarily)  that
declines  in living standards  of 20% are sustainable  through the transition
without  severe  social  disruption,  so  that  the  income  threshold  is  80W  of  the  base
level. It is  also  assumed  that  investment  should  be sustained  at  half  the  pre-
shock  level  through  the  transition.
Rural  welfare  remains  always  above  the  80%  threshold,  declining,  of  course,
as the possibilities  of exporting  are constrained. The range of aid levels
suggested  by the  model is 13.8* - 14.6*  of pre-shock  nonmining  GDP.  However,
this  does  not  take  into  account  the  costs  imposed  by rigidities  in  the  internal
adjustment  process. When  a 20%  urban  unemployment  rate  is  factored  in,  the  aid
level  rises  to  around  17*  of  nonmining  GDP. These  levels  seem  to  be  not  too  far
out of line  with the  pledges  of assistance  made to  Mongolia  at the  1991  Tokyo
meeting. 78
The small response  of the target  aid level  to increases  in the export
possibilities  for  rural  products  seems  counterintuitive,  but  this  is  because  the
simulations  in  Table  A4 include  no  mechanism  for  redistributing  incomes  between
6  For present purposes,  Japan and other Eastern  market economies  are
included  in the  term "Western".
7  The difficulty  of converting  GDP measured  in domestic  currency  into
foreign  currency  for  socialist  countries  makes  it  difficult  to  express  aid  flows
relative  to GDP.  However,  assuming  that  a reasonable  level  for  GDP  per head,
excluding  the  export  mining  sector  (which  is taken  as pure rent in the  model)
were $500  per  head,  GDP for  the  country  of  2  million  would  be about  $1  billion,
so  that  pledges  of $150  million  would  correspond  to an aid  level  of 15*  in the
model.
8  In the  model, (and  plausibly  in the  real world)  the  marginal  value  of
foreign  exchange  rises  as the  supply  is  cut  back,  so  that  the  marginal  value  of
aid falls  as the  amount  is increased. Assuming  some curvature  of the  utility
functions (so  that the marginal  value of consumption  falls  with its overall
level)  would  of course  accentuate  this.40
rural  and  urban  sectors  (migration  or extended  families)  and  also  does  not  take
into  account  possible  gains  in  export  prog,essing.  A vigorous  program  of export
expansion  could  therefore  permit  a  progressive  decrease  in  aid  levels  over  time,
even considering  the initially  small  export  base.41
Table Al:  Model Eciuations  and Base Values
Output
Rural  XrXr2
Urban  Xu =  k [a(Lu(l-UN)  )2  + (1a)  M-2]  1/2
Labor
Rural  Lr  Lr  MIG
Urban  Lu =  Lu +  MIG
Income
Rural  Yr  Prxr  -YT
Urban  Yu  Puxu  jPM  +  T + YT
Demand
Rural  Cff  =  OYr/Pr,  Cru=(1-0)yr/Pu
Urban  Cur  =  0  Yu/Pr,  Cuu=(l1-)Yu/Pu
Balances
Xr =  Cf  +  Cur  +  Er
X=  Cru  +  Cuu
PrEr  +  T =  pmM
Exoorts
Er -a.Pree
Numeraire  Pm  =  1
Welfare
Rural  Ur =  (Cff 0 Cru  )/Lr
Urban  UU=  (Curd'  (Cuu-I)  )1 )/Lu
Parameters  - Base:
Xr  =  40; k =  2.828; d =  3.305 x 104; MIG =  0; Lr  =  0.475;  Lu =  1; YT =0; T =  50;
Soviet Aid =  30; mining exports =  20; 6  =  1/2; 0  =  1/7; a =  5; ee =  -100 or -2
or -1; I =  40.
Base Values:
Pu =  Pr =  Pm  =  1; Xu =  110; M =  55; non-mining GDP =  95; Yr  =  40; Yu  =  105; Er
=  5; Ur =  Uu =  42.099.42
Table A2:  Responses to External Shocks
SHOCKI  BASS  SHOCK 1  SHOCK 2
Soviet Aid/Base GDP*(*)2 31.5%  0  0
Mining Exports/GDP*(S)  21.0%  21.0%  10.5%
Non-mining Export Demand
Elasticity  -100  -2  -1  -100  -2  -1
Urban Unemployment =  0
RESPONSE2
Rural Welfare  100  99.5  86.7  81.6  99.3  80.7  70.0
Urban Welfare  100  70.1  66.5  65.0  41.4  31.4  25.0
GDP*  100  89.5  85.3  83.6  81.1  73.3  69.0
Urban Unemployment =  20*
RESPONSE 2
Rural Welfare  100  85.6  80.4
Urban Welfare  100  61.5  29.6
GDP*  100  81.9  72.2
1.  GDP* is GDP excluding mining exports.
2.  Investment is halved to 21% of Base GDP* in response to shocks.43
Table A3:  Reverse Miaration and Rural Taxation
SHOCK
Soviet Aid  =  0, Mining Exports/GDP*1 =  10.5W
Elasticity of non-mining export demand =  -2
RESPONSE
2
Migration/urban labor (percent)  40.2
migration/rural labor (percent)  85.0
Rural =  Urban welfare  (Base  =  100)  43.1
Rate of rural taxation
to equalize welfare  (percent)  56.0
1.  GDP* is GDP excluding mining exports.
2.  Investment is halved to 21W of Base GDP*.44
Table  A4:  Cushioning  Adiustment  throuah  Aid
SHOCKI
Soviet  Aid  =  0, Mining  Exports/Base  GDP*  =  1o.5
Non-mining  Export
Demand  Elasticity  -100  -2  -1
OUTCOME 2 (minimum  welfare  threshold  =  80)
Urban  Unemployment  =  0
Urban  Welfare  80.0  80.0  80.0
Rural  Welfare  99.5  88.3  85.5
Western  Aid/Base  GDP*  (percent)  13.8  14.3  14.6
OUTCOME
Urban  unemployment  =  20%s
Urban  Welfare  80
Rural  Welfare  88.4
Western  Aid/Base  GDP*  (percent)  17.4
1.  GDP*  is GDP  excluding  mining  exports.
2.  Investment  is halved  to 21.0S  of Base  GDP*.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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